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Abstract. We present a natural field experiment designed to measure other-regarding
preferences in the market for taxis. We employed testers of varying ethnicity to take a
number of predetermined taxi journeys. In each case, we endowed them with only 80% of
the expected fare. Testers revealed the amount they could afford to pay to the driver
midjourney and asked for a portion of the journey for free. In a 2 × 2 between-subjects
design, we vary the length of the journey and whether a business card is elicited. We find
that (1) the majority of drivers give at least part of the journey for free, (2) giving is
proportional to the length of the journey, and (3) 27% of drivers complete the journey.
Evidence of outgroup negativity against black testers is also reported. In order to link our
empirical analysis to behavioral theory, we estimate the parameters of a number of utility
functions. The data and the structural analysis lend support to the quantitative predictions
of experiments that measure other-regarding preferences, and they shed further light on
how discrimination can manifest itself within our preferences.
History: Accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics.
Open Access Statement: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License. You are free to copy, distribute, transmit and adapt this work, but you must attribute this work
as “Management Science. Copyright© 2020TheAuthor(s). https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3483, used
under a Creative Commons Attribution License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.”
Funding: The authors thank the University of Exeter Business School for funding this research.
Supplemental Material: Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/
mnsc.2019.3483.
Keywords: other-regarding preferences • field experiment • discrimination
1. Introduction
A large number of experiments detail the prevalence
and significance of other-regarding preferences. Other-
regarding preferences incorporate the idea that the
traditional assumption of self-interest must sometimes
be relaxed to account for interdependent preferences,
such as fairness and envy. This class of preferences
relates to the consequence of outcomes and assumes
that individuals have a preference over how payoffs
are distributed between themselves and others. They
have been found to be important for behavior in a
range of laboratory interactions, including social di-
lemma games, dictator games, and coordination games
(Camerer and Fehr 2004, Cooper and Kagel 2009).
However, evidence from the field is mixed. For
example, Stoop et al. (2012) and Winking and Mizer
(2013) find no evidence of other-regarding prefer-
ences in public goods and dictator games conducted
in the field, whereas Stoop (2014) does. Others have
found that monitoring considerations explain be-
havior consistent with other-regarding preferences
(Bandiera et al. 2005, Benz and Meier 2008), and
List (2006) highlights the importance of reputational
concerns. By contrast, there exists a large literature
that has found evidence of other-regarding prefer-
ences (Landry et al. 2006, DellaVigna et al. 2012) in the
market for charitable giving. There are, however,
relatively few studies that have examined the im-
plications of other-regarding preferences for behav-
ior in what might be considered more “traditional”
markets (i.e., those that do not rely on discretionary
gifts but on the exchange of goods and services).
The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent
to which other-regarding preferences can shape the
behavior of economic agents operating in a market-
place. It is important to investigate this in the field
because theoretically, as shown by Dufwenberg et al.
(2011) in a general equilibrium model, agents assumed
to have other-regarding preferences could behave as if
they were selfish. We also investigate the significance
of ethnic identity in determining these preferences be-
cause other-regarding preferences form the founda-
tion for recent behavioral theories of discrimination.
Stemming from concepts of “taste-based” discrimi-
nation first detailed by Becker (1971), a prominent
theory is that other-regarding preferences are group
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contingent, or larger toward those we identify with
(the “ingroup”) in comparison with those we do not
(“outgroups”; Chen and Li 2009). Although this ex-
planation has gained prominence, as with other work
on social preferences, the majority of evidence in its
support has been obtained from laboratory experi-
ments (Goette et al. 2006, van Der Mewe and Burns
2008, Chen and Chen 2011, Drouvelis and Nosenzo
2013).1 Field experiments, by contrast, largely sug-
gest that discriminatory behavior can be attributed to
statistical discrimination (Levitt 2004, List 2004,
Gneezy et al. 2015), although it is not always possible
to distinguish between the two explanations (Bertrand
and Mullainathan 2004, Mujcic and Frijters 2013).
The study closest to ours is that of Mujcic and
Frijters (2013). Exploiting a natural interaction be-
tween bus drivers and passengers, they paid testers to
act as passengers to try to board buses without any
money. They find that white testers are allowed to
embark 72% of the time, Indian testers 51%, and black
testers just 36%. The interaction can be viewed as an
other–other allocation game (Tajfel et al. 1971), where
the driver must allocate resources between the pas-
senger and the bus company, rather than being com-
parable to the dictator game. Because drivers are not
monitored, their choices, although costly to the bus
company, are financially costless to themselves. Our
study distinguishes itself from Mujcic and Frijters
(2013) in a number of important and economically
significant ways. First, we consider discrimination in
a situation where prosocial behavior is financially
costly to the person exhibiting it. Unlike the employed
bus drivers studied by Mujcic and Frijters (2013), we
examine self-employed taxi drivers who bear all the
financial costs of their decisions. Second, we investigate
an interaction that is not scrutinized by bystanders, as
is the case in Mujcic and Frijters (2013), where other
passengers observe the bus driver’s decision.
We conduct a field experiment to examine the be-
havior of taxi drivers in Great Britain. We employed
22 testers of varying ethnicity to pose as passengers
and take a number of predetermined taxi journeys.2
In each case, we endowed them with only 80% of the
expected fare. Once the taxi meter reached 60% of the
fare, testers told the driver that they only had a certain
amount and asked if they could have the final 20%
of the journey for free. The tradeoff faced by a driver
in this transaction is analogous to the dilemmas
that subjects typically face in the laboratory: express
other-regard at a personal cost but to the benefit of
another by giving some of the journey for free or
behave selfishly but profitably by stopping once the
meter reaches the amount the passenger can afford.3
In a 2 × 2 between-subjects design, we systemati-
cally vary the length of the taxi journeys using short-
and long-distance treatments, where testers take
journeys of approximately 1.7 miles and 4.4 miles.
Because drivers assigned to the long-distance treat-
ment are able to give twice as much (in absolute terms)
as drivers assigned to the short-distance treatment, we
can examine whether the drivers’ other-regarding
preferences depend on the relative payoffs between
themselves and the passenger or if giving is constant
regardless of the amount available to give. The taxi
markets we study have thousands of drivers and tens
of thousands of passengers each week, making re-
peated interactions for infrequent customers incredi-
bly unlikely. These markets are therefore attractive
for studying the “one-shot” interactions required for
disentangling other-regard from reputational con-
cerns, and the only real possibility of meeting a driver
in a future interaction is by obtaining his or her
contact details so that he or she can be actively se-
lected. In the baseline treatments, testers reinforce the
one-shot nature of the interaction by stating to the
driver that they “don’t take taxis very often.” How-
ever, as shown by List (2006), field experiments
designed to detect social preferences need to be partic-
ularly careful about the possibility of reputational con-
cerns. To address this, and to reinforce our interpreta-
tion of the one-shot nature of the baseline treatment,
we conduct a business card treatment to examine
whether drivers are willing to give out their contact
details for potential future interactions.
We find that 74% of drivers in the baseline treat-
ment give part of the journey for free, with 27%
completing the journey at no extra cost to the tester.
We also find that the extent of giving is proportional
to the length of the journey, with drivers giving about
10% of the expected fare in both short- and long-
distance treatments. In addition, drivers do not seem
concerned about repeated business with customers,
with only 45% producing a business card when asked
to do so. Drivers who fail to give a business card be-
have identically to those assigned to the baseline
treatment. This demonstrates the inherent one-shot
nature of the interactions in the market we study,
and we feel confident that the drivers’ behavior from
the baseline treatments is not influenced by reputa-
tional concerns. However, drivers assigned to the
business card treatment who do provide a business
card are found to give significantly more than those
who do not, but only for short-distance journeys.
Differential treatment of testers conditional on both
their own and the drivers’ ethnicity is also observed:
white and South Asian drivers give significantly less,
and they are significantly less likely to complete a
journey when the tester is black. This result is robust
to a comprehensive range of field-, journey-, driver-, and
tester-specific variations obtained from each individual
journey. Tester-specific characteristics are obtained from
a complementary laboratory experiment, following the
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procedure of Xiao and Houser (2005). We elicit the
perceived aggressiveness, attractiveness, friendliness,
trustworthiness, and wealthiness of the testers’ ap-
pearance, traits that are otherwise “unobservable”
but may vary with ethnicity (Heckman 1998). To link
our results to behavioral theory, we also conduct a
structural analysis in order to obtain other-regarding
preference parameter estimates. Estimates from a
range of models reveal that the other-regarding pref-
erences of drivers are qualitatively and quantitatively
similar to those obtained from laboratory experiments
and that these preferences are group contingent. Al-
though our results are consistent with the theory of
group-contingent social preferences (i.e., taste-based
discrimination), we cannot rule out statistical expla-
nations (Phelps 1972).
This study makes a number of contributions. First,
we provide evidence that other-regarding prefer-
ences can shape the behavior of market agents with a
similar prominence to subjects in the laboratory.
Second, we demonstrate that the observed behavior
cannot be attributed to drivers’ reputational con-
cerns. Finally, we show that a model that assumes
other-regarding preferences to be group contingent is
able to explain the observed behavior.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 discusses the taxi markets we study, and
Section 3 details the experimental design. Section 4
outlines reduced-form estimation results, and it discusses
the estimates from the structural model. Section 5 dis-
cusses alternative interpretations of the results, and
Section 6 concludes.
2. The Market for Taxi Services
In Great Britain, there are two types of vehicles that
operate as taxis: private hire vehicles (PHVs) and
Hackney carriages. PHVs are not as strictly regulated
as the latter, and anyone who has a driving license and
is willing to pay the licensing fee, in practice, is able to
become a PHV driver. PHVs are unable to ply for hire
and must be prebooked over the phone: passen-
gers must actively select a company or driver for a
given journey. The price of the journey (or fare) is
independently set by each firm or negotiated ex ante,
and vehicles often do not have a fitted meter. As such,
PHV fares can vary wildly, as can the types of vehi-
cles used.
By contrast, Hackney carriages are taxis in the true
sense: drivers can ply for hire, with customers able to
hail or call them, and drivers able to wait at desig-
nated taxi ranks to be approached by customers.
Drivers and passengers are randomly matched, and
importantly, customers are unable to select their driver.
When hailing a vehicle, a customer must take which-
ever driver happens to be in the area. At a rank, cus-
tomers must take the taxi at the front of the queue, and
drivers further down the queue will refuse journeys
from customers who approach them. The only real
possibility of using the same driver repeatedly is by
obtaining his or her personal contact details.
The strict regulation of Hackney carriages ensures
their similarity, with all drivers having to pass a road
knowledge and English language test. All vehicles
have to adhere to strict standards, such as being fitted
with safety screens to separate the driver and pas-
senger, having wheelchair access, and having the
vehicle being under a certain age.4 All vehicles are
fitted with a taxi meter that displays the cost of the
journey, up to a given point, to the passenger. The
meter starts from a fixed amount and increases by a
set amount every so many yards driven or seconds
waiting in traffic. Metered fares are set by the local
authority. Those relevant for this study are detailed in
Table A1 in Online Appendix A.5
Important to our study is the fact that the metered
fare is the maximum fare the driver is able to charge
the passenger. Fare reductions are made entirely at
the driver’s discretion, and the driver is within his or
her rights to refuse any reductions the passenger
asks for. The 2014 Birmingham Unmet Taxi Demand
Survey indicates that the vast majority of Hackney
carriages (90%) are driver owned: drivers keep all
the fare and tips,6 and incur all the costs associated
with a journey.7 The cost of a discretionary fare re-
duction is therefore borne exclusively by the driver.
The markets we study are incredibly thick, with
tens of thousands of journeys taken each week and
with over a thousand licensed Hackney carriages
operating in each city. As outlined in Table A3 in
Online Appendix A, some of the taxi ranks see more
than 19,000 passengers per week. The vast majority of
taxi journeys are taken from taxi ranks, and at a taxi
rank, a driver has to wait, on average, just 12 minutes
for his or her next passenger.8 The sheer number of
transactions, large number of taxi ranks, and ability
of drivers to “cruise” streets plying for hire mean that
an infrequent user of Hackney carriages is highly
unlikely to have a repeated interaction with the same
driver, and the driver the user does interact with is
essentially randomly assigned.
3. Experimental Design and Procedure
The experiment was designed to measure other-
regarding preferences of Hackney carriage drivers
(hereafter referred to as “taxi drivers”) in actual
market transactions and determine the extent to
which these preferences vary with their own and the
passenger’s ethnicity. We use a field experiment that
allows us to observe behavior in a market setting, in a
natural interaction devoid of experimenter scrutiny.
Our subjects, the taxi drivers, were oblivious to a
study taking place.
Grosskopf and Pearce: Measuring Other-Regarding Preferences in the Taxi Market
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3.1. Testers
The testers were hired by placing a job advert looking
for “research assistants” on the Universal Jobsmatch
website, a national website initiated by the UK
government’s Department for Work and Pensions,
which anyone can use to advertise a job. The advert
stated that individuals were required to assist in
conducting some “economic research.” Although the
specific job role was not stated, it was advertised that
some walking in and around the city center would be
required. Everyone who applied was invited to attend a
briefing and training session at a neutral location, where
they were told about the job role and asked to sign
consent forms in order to take part. The rate of pay was
£8.30 per hour (all experimental materials are given in
Online Appendix A).9 We hired 22 testers in total. This
compares favorably with previous studies of taxi markets
that have typically employed just a handful of testers.10
Briefing sessions lasted between one and two hours,
and a single treatment was discussed in detail. Testers
were given copies of one script they were required to
follow and the experimental sheet theywould have to
complete.11 They were told that the script may vary
and that they would be given a chance to practice any
variants before completing the task. Testers were told
explicitly to follow the script as closely as possible,
and when interacting with the drivers, they were told
they must not attempt to influence any of their de-
cisions. Testers were told not to engage in conver-
sation with the drivers, and scripted responses were
given to anticipated questions. Our hypotheses and
predictions regarding the study were never made
clear to the testers, and not all the testers met each
other, reducing the opportunity for testers to guess that
the studymight involve their own ethnicity.12 All testers
wore casual clothing.13
Each tester also consented to have his or her face
photographed for “research purposes.”Once the field
experiment was complete, we had the testers’ ap-
pearance rated by subjects in a follow-up laboratory
experiment. Subjects in the laboratory had to rate the
pictures for aggressiveness, attractiveness, friendli-
ness, trustworthiness, and wealthiness on a scale from
1 to 10 (with 1 being “not very” and 10 being “very”).
This was done to control for otherwise unobservable
characteristics that may vary with the testers’ eth-
nicity (Heckman 1998), although we acknowledge
that they are entirely subjective.
These five characteristics were chosen for a number
of reasons. First, the importance of an individual’s
attractiveness in fostering the helping behaviors of
others has been outlined in a wealth of studies, with
the most attractive typically found to be treated most
generously (Benson et al. 1976). Attractiveness has
also been shown to be successful in promoting others’
other-regarding behaviors (Landry et al. 2006) and is
correlated with labor market outcomes (Mobius and
Rosenblat 2006). Second, historical and recent evi-
dence suggests that faces that appear aggressive and
unfriendly, or threatening, may stimulate a different
thought system in comparison with one seen as
nonthreatening. For example, O¨hman (1986) argues
that threatening faces activate the “fear system” and
therefore provide a powerful stimulus. If this is the
case, faces displaying differing levels of aggression
and friendliness may trigger different types of be-
haviors, such as self-defensive compared with help-
ing behaviors (see Schupp et al. (2004) for evidence
and a discussion of the literature). Third, any dif-
ferential in giving stemming from ethnicity may be
related to status differences relating towealth, similar
to that shown by Mitra and Ray (2014). Finally, as the
interaction between a driver and tester may rely on
the driver trusting the passenger regarding how
much money he or she has, we also elicit the pas-
sengers’ facial appearance of trustworthiness.
To obtain the ratings, we follow a procedure similar
to that used by Landry et al. (2006). Each laboratory
subject was shown a random set of 11 photos and
asked to rate their appearance. Following Xiao and
Houser (2005), to increase subjects’ attentiveness to the
task, they were told that one photo and one character-
istic of that photo would be selected at random, and if
their decision for that photo and that characteristic
was in line with the ratings of the majority of the other
subjects in the session, they would receive £2. It took
subjects about 10 minutes to rate all the photos re-
quired of them.14 A sample of 1,188 ratings of the 22
testers was obtained from 108 laboratory subjects.
The testers’ characteristics, along with these ratings,
are presented in Table B6 in Online Appendix B.15
Wefind that black testers are rated significantly less
attractive, trustworthy, friendly, and wealthy than
both white and South Asian testers (p < 0.001 in all
cases, robust rank-order tests). Black testers are also
rated the most aggressive (p < 0.001 in both cases,
robust rank-order tests). Interestingly, white testers
are rated as less attractive, trustworthy, friendly, and
wealthy than South Asian testers (p  0.06 for at-
tractiveness, p < 0.001 in all other cases, robust rank-
order tests). White testers are also seen as more ag-
gressive than South Asian testers (p < 0.001, robust
rank-order test). We control for these tester-specific
variations in our parametric analysis in Section 4.
We focus exclusively on facial appearance because
of the way that the driver and tester interact while in
the taxi. As outlined in Section 3.2, the driver’s de-
cision to behave in an other-regarding manner is
madewhile he or she is driving, so he or she is likely to
view the tester briefly, either through the rearview
mirror or by looking over his or her shoulder. Visual
emphasis will be placed on the tester’s face rather
Grosskopf and Pearce: Measuring Other-Regarding Preferences in the Taxi Market
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than on other physical traits, such as bodymass index,
height, or build.
3.2. Procedure
On a given day, a tester was required to complete
multiple journeys ranging from 3 to 10. Journeys
(designated as short and long) were randomly assigned
to testers. Because the journeys were taken from ranks,
the testers had to wait for their turn to approach the taxi
at the front of the rank, enter the taxi, and then state
their destination.16 The experiment first varies the
distance of the journeys in short- and long-distance
treatments, with respective journey lengths of ap-
proximately 1.7 miles and 4.4 miles, which had ex-
pected fares of approximately £5 and £10, respectively.
The journeys were calibrated using Google Maps and
the relevant taxi fare tables. The journeys always started
from a rank,17 and destinations were landmarks and
well-known locations that did not have a designated
taxi rank.18 The testers were endowed with either
£4 or £8 for each journey, depending on its distance.
The journeys were taken in either Birmingham or the
greater Manchester area, with those starting in Bir-
mingham taken over five days and those in Manchester
over three. All journeys were taken between 11 a.m. and
5 p.m., and at least four testers were in the field at
any given time, alongwith an experimenter. Testers took
part in multiple treatments across different days.
On entering the taxi, the tester first stated his or her
destination and then spoke a simple entry state-
ment.19 In the baseline treatment, the tester stated, “I
don’t take taxis very often”; in the business card
treatment, he or she stated, “I’m looking for a reliable
driver for future journeys. Can I have a business
card?” The first statement signals to the driver that
the interaction is one shot, because a passenger who
does not take taxis very often is unlikely to meet the
same driver twice. The second statement was cho-
sen following the repeat business treatment of a
field experiment conducted by Schneider (2012). The
statement gave the driver the opportunity to give out
a business card before the journey began. The pro-
portion of cards given out should provide some in-
dication of the drivers’ concern for repeated business,
with a higher proportion signaling a higher concern.
The scripts were designed to be kept simple in order
not only to keep them standardized and to avoid actor
bias (Heckman 1998) but also to keep them natural
and believable to the drivers. This design feature
clearly contrasts with laboratory experiments, where
interactions are designed to be “sterile” and, pre-
dominantly, without context.20
Once the taxi journey began, the testers were re-
quired to wait in silence until the meter reached a
certain amount: £3 in short- and £6 in long-distance
journeys, or 60% of the expected fare. Once the meter
reached this amount, testers stated to the driver, “I’m
sorry, I only have £x! Can you still take me to my
destination for that amount?,” where x  £4 in short-
and x  £8 in long-distance journeys. By revealing this
to the driver once the meter reached 60% of the ex-
pected fare, the driver was given ample time to stop
the taxi. It also signaled the testers’ intention to pay
the amount that they could afford, removing any
belief the driver may have that the passenger would
not pay. Table 1 summarizes the experimental design.
We refer to the driver continuing the journey past
the amount that the tester can afford as giving, which
is accuratelymeasured by themeter.We define giving
in this way because it provides a reasonable lower
bound of the drivers’ opportunity cost. This is because a
driver can always return to a rank and pick up his or her
next passenger. A follow-up survey conducted at taxi
ranks in Manchester, presented in full in Section 5, re-
veals that the vast majority of taxi journeys begin at a
taxi rank and that themajority of taxi drivers return to
the rank from which the journey started. Furthermore,
the 2015Unmet Taxi Demand Survey published by the
Manchester City Council suggests that the average
wait time for a passenger at a taxi rank is very short
(12 minutes). Regardless of how the driver works, on
fixed shifts or income targeting (Camerer et al. 1997),
the time spent driving the passenger beyond the
amount he or she can afford is time spent not earning.
Once the driver decided how much to give and
where to end the journey, the tester had to ask for a
receipt, leave the taxi, and discreetly complete an
experimental sheet. The sheet included subjective
characteristics of the driver, such as his or her age,
gender (1 if male), and ethnicity;measures of the field,
including traffic intensity (recorded on a 10-point
scale: 1 if not busy, 10 if very busy) and the weather
(1 if raining); and finally, characteristics of the ride,
including whether the driver attempted a conversa-
tion (1 if yes), if he or she offered to drive to a
cashpoint/automatic teller machine (ATM; 1 if yes),
and (in the business card treatment) if he or she gave a
business card or not (1 if one was given). Most impor-
tant, the testers had to record the final meter reading
Table 1. Experimental Design Summary
Short distance Long distance
Baseline Entry script “I don’t take taxis very often.”
Endowment (£) 4 8
Expected fare (£) 5 10
Business card Entry script “I’m looking for a reliable
driver for future journeys.
Can I have a business card?”
Endowment (£) 4 8
Expected fare (£) 5 10
Note. The expected fare of journeys in each treatment is approximate.
Grosskopf and Pearce: Measuring Other-Regarding Preferences in the Taxi Market
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and whether the driver completed the journey or
not.21 Table 2 presents the average characteristics as-
sociated with the driver,22 the field conditions, and the
ride, as reported by the testers.23
4. Results
In this section, we outline the experimental results.
A number of common features are present through-
out the analysis. Where nonparametric tests are used,
both the p-value and the test statistic are presented
in parentheses. Unless otherwise stated, all tests are
two-sided, and journeys from all treatments are pooled
in the regressions.
4.1. Journey Calibration Checks
Some initial calibration checks are conducted in order
to examinewhether our expected fare calculations are
accurate. Table 3 outlines the recorded fare, expected
fare, and amounts given as a percentage of the ex-
pected fare from journeyswhere the driver completed
the journey. Observations are disaggregated by short-
and long-distance journeys. By comparing the ob-
served fare of a completed journey with its expected
fare, we can examine the accuracy of our expected
fare calculations. This will also shed light on how the
drivers perceived the testers (i.e., as locals or nonlocals;
Balafoutas et al. 2013). Minor discrepancies between
recorded and expected fares are to be expected largely
because of variations in traffic intensity and other
random shocks.
Formally comparing the recorded and expected
fares, we report no significant differences in the short-
distance treatment (p  0.304, t-test) or long-distance
treatment (p  0.539, t-test). The experiment was de-
signed so that the driver would have to give about 20%
of the expected fare for free in order to complete the
journey. Examining this, we find that the amount given
as a percentage of the expected fare in the observed
completed journeys is not significantly different from
the planned 20% in both the short- (p  0.88, sign test)
and long-distance (p  1, sign test) treatments. There-
fore, we conclude that the journey planning is accurate.
4.2. Other-Regard
Table 4 outlines average amounts given by drivers
and the proportion of journeys they completed by
treatment and by the testers’ ethnicity. To examine
whether relative payoffs are a motivating factor be-
hind the amounts that drivers are giving, we report
giving as a percentage of the expected fare. Figure 1
displays the distribution of giving from each treatment.
Table 5 reports a number of random effects Tobit
regressions. In models (1)–(4), giving in pounds by
driver i to tester j is the dependent variable. In models
(5)–(12), giving as a percentage of the expected fare by
driver i to tester j is the dependent variable. Con-
sidering giving in this way enables us to control for
the variation in journey lengths and therefore varia-
tion in the expected fares of journeys, both within
and between treatments. In each regression, dummy
variables for the long-distance treatment and the
business card treatment (BusC) are included along
with their interaction; the short-distance baseline
treatment is taken as the control. Because receiving a
business card from the driver, rather than simply ask-
ing for one, is what most likely activates any repeat
Table 2. Driver, Field, and Ride Characteristics
Driver characteristics Driver ethnicity
All drivers White Black South Asian Other
Age 44.34 50.06 40.36 42.60 41.33
(10.67) (10.56) (9.36) (10.03) (11.45)
Gender (1 if male) 0.99 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00
(0.12) (0.17) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00)
Journeys 283.00 71.00 11.00 191.00 10.00
Field characteristics
Traffic Intensity (1 = not busy; 10 = very busy) 4.44
(2.26)
Weather (1 if raining; 0 otherwise) 0.11
(0.32)
Ride characteristics
Conversation (1 if driver attempted a conversation) 0.28
(0.45)
Cashpoint (1 if driver offered a cashpoint) 0.04
(0.20)
Business card, business card treatment only (1 if given) 0.45
(0.50)
Receipt (1 if given) 0.89
(0.31)
Notes. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Where the driver’s
ethnicity is classified as “Other,” the tester either did not complete the
experimental sheet or classified the driver outside the three main
ethnic groups that are specified.
Table 3. Fares, Expected Fares, and Average Giving
Conditional on the Driver Completing the Journey
Parameter Short distance Long distance
Recorded Fare (£) 5.44 10.43
(1.30) (1.47)
Expected Fare (£) 5.65 10.22
(0.22) (0.93)
Amount Given, % Exp. Fare 26.00 24.00
(0.23) (0.15)
Completed journeys 44 22
Notes. We exclude from these calculations 18 observations where the
driver completed the journey but switched off the meter before the
journey was completed. In these 18 cases, in Section 4.2, we
approximate the meter reading by the expected fare. Standard
deviations are in parentheses.
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businessmechanism, inmodels (4) and (8),we include
an additional dummy variable, BusC Given, that takes
a value of 1 if a business card was given and 0 oth-
erwise. We include this dummy without any inter-
actions in order to provide an easily interpretable
estimate of its net effect on driver giving.
In each subsequent model, the number of explan-
atory variables is increased or varied in order to ex-
amine the robustness of the estimated treatment ef-
fects. The additional variables we use were those
recorded by the testers, and outlined in Table 2, which
we group into three distinct sets: field, city, and ride
controls. The set of field controls includes the variable
for traffic intensity (recorded on a 10-point scale: 1 if
not busy, 10 if very busy) and a dummy controlling
for theweather conditions (1 if raining). The set of city
controls includes three dummies for the location
where the journey was taken: Birmingham, Trafford,
or Salford (1 if yes), with those in Manchester taken
as the baseline. The set of ride controls includes
dummies controlling forwhether the driver offered to
take the passenger to a cashpoint/ATM (1 if offered)
and if he or she tried to engage in a conversation
(1 if yes).
In addition, we examine driver-giving conditional
on the testers’ ethnicity.We include dummy variables
that take a value of 1 (and 0 otherwise) if the testerwas
Black, South Asian, and/orMale. We also include three
additional sets of control variables: driver, tester, and
appearance controls. The set of driver and tester
controls includes the drivers’ and testers’ gender
and age. The set of appearance controls includes the
Figure 1. (Color online) Distribution of Giving,
by Treatment
Table 4. Average Driver Giving by Treatment and Testers’ Ethnicity
Testers’ ethnicity Parameter
Baseline Business Card
Short Long Short Long
White Amount Given (£) 0.64 1.23 0.87 1.22
(0.62) (1.44) (0.74) (1.31)
Amount Given, % Exp. Fare 11 13 16 12
(0.11) (0.16) (0.13) (0.13)
Number of Journeys 60 26 49 29
Black Amount Given (£) 0.28 0.79 0.57 1.05
(0.46) (0.99) (1.57) (1.31)
Amount Given, % Exp. Fare 5 8 10 10
(0.08) (0.09) (0.28) (0.12)
Number of Journeys 26 11 30 11
South Asian Amount Given (£) 1.23 1.28 0.52 0.54
(1.40) (1.80) (0.65) (0.53)
Amount Given, % Exp. Fare 23 12 9 5
(0.26) (0.17) (0.12) (0.05)
Number of Journeys 9 11 14 7
All testers Amount Given (£) 0.60 1.14 0.72 1.08
(0.73) (1.43) (1.07) (1.23)
Amount Given, % Exp. Fare 11 11 13 10
(0.13) (0.15) (0.19) (0.12)
Proportion of Journeys Completed 0.27 0.27 0.31 0.34
Total number of journeys 95 48 93 47
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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average rating the tester was given along each of
the appearance dimensions we elicited, attractive-
ness, aggressiveness, friendliness, trustworthiness,
and wealthiness, as reported in Table B6 in Online
Appendix B.
Result 1. The majority of taxi drivers exhibit other-
regarding preferences.
Support. Considering journeys from the baseline
treatment, the null hypothesis of no giving can be
rejected at the 1% level in both long- and short-
distance journeys (p < 0.01, both cases, sign test).
We find that 74% of drivers in these treatments give
part of the journey for free, with 27% completing the
journey in full. Similar findings are observed in the
business card treatment, with 76% of drivers giving at
least part of the journey for free, with 32% of all
journeys being completed in full.
Result 2. Drivers’ other-regarding preferences are well
defined over relative payoffs.
Support. Examining journeys from the baseline
treatment, average driver-giving is significantly dif-
ferent in short-distance journeys in comparison with
long-distance journeys (p  0.079, robust rank-order
test). This is shown graphically in Figure 2(a). The
distribution of giving is also found to vary by the
distance of the journey (p  0.059, Kruskal–Wallis
test). Regressions (1)–(3) in Table 5 support these
conclusions, reporting significant and positive co-
efficient estimates on the long-distance dummy
(p < 0.01).
However, when giving as a percentage of the ex-
pected fare is considered, no significant differences
are reported by distance (p  0.88, robust rank-order
test; see Figure 2(b)). Furthermore, the distance of the
journey has no significant effect on the distribution of
giving (p  0.86, Kruskal–Wallis test), and no signif-
icant treatment effects are reported in models (5)–(12)
when the dependent variable is giving as a percent-
age of the expected fare (p > 0.1 in all cases, in all
Table 5. Determinants of Driver Giving
Random effects Tobit regressions
Amount given (in £) in models (1)–(4) Amount given (% of the expected fare) in models (5)–(12)
Dep. variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Long 0.676*** 0.729*** 0.734*** 0.049 0.070 0.070 0.028 0.013 0.000 0.022
(0.254) (0.278) (0.272) (0.068) (0.075) (0.074) (0.055) (0.055) (0.067) (0.069)
BusC 0.072 0.042 0.048 0.038 0.030 0.033 0.024 0.031 0.034 0.027
(0.157) (0.159) (0.156) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
BusC × Long 0.034 0.062 0.034 0.011 0.026 0.023 0.023 0.013 0.005 0.034
(0.295) (0.301) (0.295) (0.078) (0.080) (0.080) (0.077) (0.076) (0.076) (0.078)
BusC Given 0.217 0.112**
(0.168) (0.044)
Black −0.121*** −0.123*** −0.111** −0.127**
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.050)
South Asian −0.054 −0.059 −0.052 0.034
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.066)
Male −0.097** −0.095** −0.087** −0.135**
(0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.063)
Constant 1.243*** 1.495*** 1.388*** 1.250*** 0.293*** 0.335*** 0.310*** 0.276** 0.286 0.266 0.357* 0.630
(0.389) (0.389) (0.060) (0.448) (0.100) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.194) (0.193) (0.199) (0.731)
Observations 283 282 281 280 283 282 281 280 275 274 274 274
Controls
City U U U U U U U U U U
Field U U U U U U U U
Ride U U U U U U U
Driver U U U U
Tester U U U U
Appearance U
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses. The number of observations falls slightly as more controls are included as a result of missing entries.
Models (1)–(4) are left-censored at 0 and right-censored at the difference between the expected fare had the driver completed the journey and the
amount paid by the tester. Models (1)–(8) include tester fixed effects. Models (5)–(12) are left-censored at 0 and right-censored at 1. All reported
explanatory variables are dummy variables that take values of 1 in the following cases (and 0 otherwise): Long, if a long-distance journey; BusC, if
the business card treatment; BusCGiven, if a business cardwas given by the driverwhen asked;Black, if the tester is black; South Asian, if the tester
is South Asian; andMale, if the tester is male. “Constant” denotes the estimate of the constant. “Obs.” denotes the number of observations. None
of the appearance controls are estimated to have a significant effect on giving at the 5% level.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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regressions in Table 5). This suggests that giving,
relative to the length of the journey, is constant.
Result 3. Asking for a business card has no effect on
drivers’ behavior. However, conditional on giving a
business card, drivers give significantly more.
Support. Comparing average giving between busi-
ness card and baseline treatments, no significant dif-
ferences are reported between the short- and long-
distance treatments, respectively (p  0.34 and p 
0.67, robust rank-order tests). Similarly, asking for
a business card has no significant impact on the distri-
bution of giving in either short- or long-distance treat-
ments, respectively (p  0.67 and p  0.44, Kruskal–
Wallis test). The same is true for giving as a percentage
of the expected fare, with no significant differences
found between business card and baseline treatments
in short- or long-distance journeys or when journeys
are pooled (p > 0.1 in all cases, robust rank-order
tests). Estimates from Table 5 support these results,
with the coefficient on theBusC dummy found to be not
significant at conventional levels across regressions
(p > 0.1 in all cases). The estimates from Table 5 also
outline how drivers who do give a business card do not
give significantly more of the journey for free in abso-
lute terms than thosewhodonot (model (4),p > 0.1), but
they do give more as a percentage of the expected fare
(model (8), p < 0.05).24
Result 3 is supportive of the idea that drivers who
ply for hire at taxi ranks treat the interactions they
have with passengers as one shot and thus that our
baseline interactions are not confounded with repu-
tational concerns. Result 3 also suggests that repeated
business is not amajor concern for the drivers because
repeated interaction effects are not triggered when
they are asked for a business card. This is likely be-
cause the majority of drivers choose not to pro-
vide one, with only 45% deciding to provide one
when asked (see Table 2). However, if the tester re-
ceives a business card, the driver does give signifi-
cantly more.25 This suggests repeated interaction
effects could play a role in fostering other-regard
in this setting but first need to be successfully
“activated.”26
We now consider the effect that the testers’ ethnicity
has on the drivers’ behavior and conduct pairwise
comparisons of drivers giving to black, white, and
South Asian testers. In line with the previous litera-
ture, our primary concern is in considering differ-
entials between black and white testers. In addition,
as we have fewer South Asian observations in com-
parison with the number of black and white observa-
tions (41 journeys compared with 78 and 164 journeys,
respectively), the results and discussions related to the
South Asian testers should be interpreted with care.
To consider the effect of ethnicity on journey com-
pletions, Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients and
marginal effects from a number of random effects
probit regressions, where the dependent variable is a
dummy that takes a value of 1 if the journey was
completed and 0 otherwise. We increase the number
of explanatory variables in each subsequent model
and use the same sets of control variables as outlined
in Table 5.
Result 4. Drivers’ other-regard is smallest when the
tester is black.
Support. Comparing the proportion of journeys
completed by testers’ ethnicity, we find that black tes-
ters have their journey completed significantly less of-
ten than white and South Asian testers, respectively, in
thebaseline treatment (p  0.045 and p  0.088, Fisher’s
exact test; see also Figure 3). No significant differences
are reported between white and South Asian testers
(p  0.793, Fisher’s exact test). The estimates of ran-
dom effects probit regressions in Table 6 outline
how the estimated coefficient on the black dummy is
Figure 2. (Color online) Average Giving
Note. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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negative and significant (p < 0.01). This estimate is
robust to specification changes and becomes in-
creasingly significant as more controls are included.
The estimated marginal effect size is robust across
models and is estimated to be highly significant
(p < 0.01 in all cases). Similar to Table 5, none of the
appearance characteristics is found to be significant at
the 5% level.
Pairwise comparisons of average giving by drivers
to white, black, and South Asian testers in the base-
line treatment reveals no significant differences be-
tween white and South Asian testers in the short- or
long-distance treatments, respectively (p  0.41 and
p  0.88, robust rank-order tests). However, signifi-
cant differences between white and black testers are
reported in the short- but not in the long-distance
treatment, respectively (p  0.001 and p  0.37, robust
rank-order tests). Similarly, a significant difference
between South Asian and black testers is found in the
short- but not in the long-distance treatment, respec-
tively (p  0.07 and p  0.47, robust rank-order tests).
Considering the amount given as a percentage of
the expected fare reveals that both white and South
Asian testers are given significantly more than black
testers, respectively (p  0.002 and p  0.045, robust
rank-order tests), but no differences are found between
Table 6. Determinants of Journey Completion
Random effects probit regressions
Journey completed
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Black −0.494** −0.509** −0.544** −0.512** −0.650***
(0.198) (0.217) (0.221) (0.223) (0.246)
South Asian −0.313 −0.419 −0.450* −0.438 −0.124
(0.242) (0.267) (0.268) (0.271) (0.326)
Male −0.335* −0.335* −0.326 −0.344
(0.190) (0.193) (0.201) (0.310)
Constant −0.913 0.152 0.074 0.293 3.658
(0.760) (0.862) (0.877) (0.919) (3.621)
Observations 274 274 273 273 273
Marginal effects
Black −0.160*** −0.161** −0.169*** −0.159** −0.188***
(0.060) (0.065) (0.064) (0.065) (0.064)
South Asian −0.107 −0.136* −0.143* −0.139* −0.041
(0.078) (0.081) (0.079) (0.079) (0.106)
Male −0.120* −0.118* −0.114* −0.116
(0.066) (0.066) (0.069) (0.104)
Controls
Treatment U U U U U
Driver U U U U U
Tester U U U U




Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses.Marginal effects are evaluatedwhere the passengers’ ethnicity
is white, with all other variables evaluated at the mean. All reported explanatory variables are dummy
variables that take values of 1 in the following cases (and 0 otherwise): Black, if the tester is black; South
Asian, if the tester is South Asian; andMale, if the tester is male. Treatment controls includes a dummy for
long-distance journeys, a dummy for the business card treatment, and a dummy for whether a business
card was received, along with interactions. Estimates from the Appearance controls are not reported for
space concerns and because none are found to be significant at the 5% level.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Figure 3. (Color online) Proportion of Journeys Completed,
by Tester Ethnicity
Note. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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white and South Asian testers, respectively (p  0.56,
robust rank-order test). The estimates in Table 5
further support the nonparametric results: across
regressions (5)–(12), the coefficient on the black
dummy is negative, highly significant (p < 0.05 in all
cases, Wald tests), and robust to changes in the model
specification. None of the appearance controls in-
cluded in model (12) in Table 5 is found to have a
significant effect on giving.
The differential treatment of testers by ethnicity
remains in the business card treatment, with white
testers receiving more than black testers in the short-
distance treatment (p < 0.001, robust rank-order test),
although no difference is observed betweenwhite and
SouthAsian testers (p  0.63, robust rank-order tests).
No differences are reported between black and South
Asian testers in either distance treatment (p > 0.1,
robust rank-order test in both cases). Comparing
giving as a percentage of the expected fare reveals
differences in giving between white and black and
white and South Asian testers, respectively (p < 0.001
and p  0.02, robust rank-order tests) but no differ-
ence between black and South Asian testers, respec-
tively (p  0.817, robust rank-order test).27
Result 4 outlines how black testers are treated
significantly worse than white and South Asian tes-
ters. Indeed, the inclusion of additional controls, in
particular, the appearance characteristics, increases
the magnitude of the coefficient of the black dummy
in both the tobit and probit regressions. Furthermore,
despite the significant differences in appearance char-
acteristics between ethnicities, they are estimated to
have no significant effect on journey completion. De-
spite their subjectivity, the use of these characteristics
serves to demonstrate that the results are robust even
when controlling for significant differences in appear-
ance characteristics between social groups. The evi-
dence is consistent with taste-based discrimination
manifested in social preferences, although, as with any
observed disparity between social groups in a strategic
setting, they can also potentially be rationalized as
statistical discrimination.28
4.3. Structural Models
The reduced-form estimates given in Section 4.2 pro-
vide evidence of variation in driver giving that is
conditional on the testers’ ethnicity. However, they
do not provide quantitative estimates of the prefer-
ences that we assume to underpin this behavior. We
estimate the parameters of a number of utility func-
tions in order to link our empirical analysis to be-
havioral theory that assumes that individuals dif-
ferentiate between social groups as a consequence of
taste-based discrimination. Details of the estimation
strategy and the estimates themselves are given in
Online Appendix B.
The structural estimates, given in Table B2 in Online
Appendix B, confirm the reduced-form estimation
results and suggest that other-regarding preferences
are group contingent. Because the taxi drivers face
a situation that is analogous to laboratory dictator
games, we use the preference estimates to predict the
drivers’ behavior in a hypothetical £10 dictator game.
These predictions are given in Table B3 in Online
Appendix B. By doing this, we can benchmark the
predictions our estimates produce against the be-
havior observed in laboratory experiments in the
literature. We find that our estimates produce be-
havior that is consistent with the other-regarding
preference literature.
5. Discussion
Although the results in Section 4 are assumed to be a
consequence of drivers having other-regarding pref-
erences, there are other potential explanations. The
extent of giving can be explained by (1) stopping
distances associated with finding somewhere safe to
drop the passenger, (2) convenience for the driver
associated with considerations regarding his or her
next journey, (3) the drivers’ experience and expecta-
tions of passengers bargaining, and (4) social pres-
sure. In addition, the observations relating to eth-
nicity could be an artifact of multiple hypothesis
testing. Although (1) and (2) may seem similar,
we feel it is important to separate the transactional
explanation of the drivers’ behavior, explanation
(1), from the strategic motivation, explanation (2),
that could stem from expectations about the next
customer. We examine each of these alternative
explanations individually and find little evidence
for their support. Even when taking the evidence
jointly, the main conclusion of our paper remains
unchanged.
To examine (1), we begin by making the assump-
tion that some giving may be an artifact of the drivers
finding a convenient location for the passenger to
alight.Wedo this by assuming that the driver requires
either one, two, or three additional charges on the
meter (approximately 190, 380, and 570 yards, re-
spectively) in order to find a suitable location.29 For
example, a driver recorded as giving £0.20 may ac-
tually have given nothing but required £0.20 worth of
metered distance (approximately 190 yards or a single
charge on themeter) in order to find a location to stop.
Thus, as a robustness check, giving is redefined as the
amount of the journey that is given for free minus the
amount the driver is induced to give as a consequence
of the assumed stopping distance. This is in addition
to the driver already having £1 worth of metered
distance as a notice period in the short-distance
treatment and £2 worth of metered distance as a
notice period in the long-distance treatment in order
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to stop the taxi.30 Table 7 presents average giving
under the three different assumptions about stopping
distance using observations from the baseline, short-,
and long-distance treatments.
As can be seen in Table 7, giving is still significantly
different from zero for both short- and long-distance
journeys regardless of the assumed stopping dis-
tance. Drivers also give significantly more in the
long-distance treatment in comparison with the short-
distance treatment under all three stopping distance
assumptions (p  0.036, p  0.037, and p  0.037, ro-
bust rank-order tests). Furthermore, the majority of
drivers still give more than zero, except when a
conservative stopping distance of 570 yards is as-
sumed. Even then, almost half of all drivers still give
positive amounts. As such, we conclude that our
results are robust to stopping distance confounds.
To shed light on (2) and (3), we conducted a survey
of 50 taxi drivers from ranks used within the study
and 65 passengers that were queuing for a taxi, and
we observed the behavior of 97 passengers entering
taxis from a rank.31 To understand the drivers’ rou-
tine, drivers were asked to indicate the number of
daily journeys, how many of these journeys start at a
taxi rank, and what they believe the average fare is.
Drivers were also asked about the expected fare of a
sample short- and long-distance journey, where the
sample journeys were journeys that we used within
the study.32
To address (2), drivers were asked a multiple-
choice question about what they did on completing
a journey: return to a home rank, return to a different
rank, cruise and look for a passenger, or do something
else. This question was designed to shed light on
the drivers’ opportunity cost of giving. Because all
journeys that were taken in the experiment involved
driving away from a home rank, returning to the rank
would have been more costly, in terms of both time
and fuel, if the driver had continued to drive past the
amount the passenger could afford.
To address (3), drivers were asked if they would be
willing to bargain over the journey specified before the
journey began and the lowest fare they would accept
if they were willing to negotiate. In addition, they
were asked if they would be willing to bargain with a
passenger who was inside the taxi. Passengers were
asked if they ever bargained with the driver when
catching a taxi from the rank.
The drivers’ responses are presented in Table 8,
panel A. The passengers’ responses and the recorded
observation results are presented in panel B. The
responses in Table 8 highlight three main points re-
lating to (2). First, the vastmajority of taxi journeys are
taken from ranks (86%), indicating a low proportion
being hailed. Second, the majority of drivers report
returning to a home rank (74%). This suggests that
giving to the passenger, by continuing to drive away
from the rank, is not done at the drivers’ convenience.
On the contrary, driving away from the rank is
analogous to driving away from the next passenger,
and therefore, it is costly.
Addressing (3), we note from Table 8 that the vast
majority of drivers (96% for a hypothetical short-
distance journey and 88% for a hypothetical long-
distance journey) said they would not bargain with a
passenger before the passenger was inside the vehi-
cle. The lowest fare they would accept is also above
the amount our testers could afford. In addition, the
majority of drivers would refuse to bargain with
passengers midjourney (96%). Drivers’ expected fare
estimates are also in line with our own calculations,
suggesting that they can accurately calculate how
much each journey will cost. This is perhaps un-
surprising because the “knowledge” tests that drivers
operating in Britain are required to take (and pass)
have been shown to change the structure of their
brains (Maguire et al. 2000), allowing them to more
easily map and plan a route. Our survey and obser-
vation of passengers also show that the desire to
negotiate is limited, with only a single passenger
observed attempting to bargain with a driver and
Table 7. Stopping Distances and Driver Giving
Assumed stopping distance
Amount given (£)
Short Long Percent giving more than £0
190 yards 0.459*** 1.028*** 71.3
(0.68) (1.329)
380 yards 0.347*** 0.896*** 58.0
(0.626) (1.275)
570 yards 0.266*** 0.787*** 42.7
(0.564) (1.208)
Notes. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Amounts given only include baseline observations.
When giving defined in this way produces a negative amount given, we assume that the driver decided
to give nothing.
*** denotes significance at the 1% level.
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only two reporting that they have ever bargained
with drivers over fares. Therefore, it seems unlikely
that drivers are accustomed to bargaining with
passengers because the vastmajority of journeys are not
bargained over.33
Interpretation (4) implies that drivers are concerned
about behaving unkindly or dislike confrontation, and
they therefore give despite having a preference not to.
Thiswould resonatewith the conclusion ofDellaVigna
et al. (2012). However, there are a number of potential
issues with this interpretation. First, not giving away
goods and services for free in a market setting is
unlikely to be perceived as unkind. For example, in an
analogous situation in a retail setting, it is unlikely
that a customerwhowished to purchase 10 units of an
item but who could only afford to buy 8would regard
a seller as unkind if the seller refused to give the
customer 2 additional units for free. This contrasts
with charitable giving, where giving to those who
need it might be viewed as a normative action. Sec-
ond, about 70%of drivers do not complete the journey
but choose to eject the passenger before reaching the
destination, and it seems unlikely that differences in
perceived social pressure can explain the within-
treatment variation in giving, given the standardi-
zation of the interactions, or can explainwhy giving is
found to be proportional to the length of the journey.
Third, in the context of our study, passengers could
easily have taken an alternative and cheaper mode of
transport, or they could have walked the final portion
of the journey they could not afford.
Finally, to address concerns related to multiple
hypothesis testing, we adjust the calculated p-values
using the Holm–Bonferroni procedure (Holm 1979).
These corrections, along with a description of the
procedure, are presented in Section B.6 of Online
Appendix B.Wefind thatwhen correcting the p-values
for the parametric analysis, Results 1–4 are found to
be robust. Furthermore, when correcting the p-values
from the nonparametric tests for Result 4, applying
the most conservative correction procedure possible,
we find that the black/white disparity in giving re-
mains significant. However, considering just the non-
parametric statistics, we cannot distinguish any of the
comparisons that involve South Asian testers from
type I error.
6. Conclusion
We report evidence that the majority of taxi drivers
behave in an other-regarding manner in a market
setting with limited possibilities for repeated in-
teractions. Through our experimental design, we find
evidence that taxi drivers have well-defined prefer-
ences over relative payoffs, a finding that resonates
with the results of numerous laboratory experiments
and behavioral theories of social preferences. We
show that our findings are robust to a wide range of
controls and a variety of potential behavioral and
statistical confounds.
Variation in the ethnicity of the driver and the tester
also allows us to explore recent theories of taste-based
discrimination—namely, that other-regarding pref-
erences are group contingent. We find evidence that
the drivers’ propensity to give is significantly smaller
Table 8. Driver and Passenger Survey Responses
Panel A: Driver survey, N  50
Total No. of daily journeys 12.94
(4.47)
No. of journeys that start at a rank 11.26
(4.45)
Average fare (£) 6.40
(1.38)
Percent of journeys that start at a ranka 86.14
(0.12)
Modal taxi model LTI TXII
Short- Expected fare (£) 6.17
distance (0.78)
journeys Willing to bargain? (1 if yes) 0.06
(0.24)
Lowest fare if willing (£) 4.73
(2.11)
Willing to bargain inside the taxi? (1 if yes) 0.04
(0.20)
On completion
Return to home rank (%) 74
Return to a different rank (%)b 16
Cruise (%) 10
Long- Expected fare (£) 11.85
distance (1.97)
journeys Willing to bargain? (1 if yes) 0.12
(0.33)
Lowest fare if willing (£) 9.33
(1.03)
Willing to bargain inside the taxi? (1 if yes) 0.04
(0.20)
On completion
Return to home rank (%) 76
Return to a different rank (%) 10
Cruise (%) 10
Panel B: Passenger survey
Do you bargain? (1 if yes), N  65 0.03
(0.181)
Observed bargaining (1 if yes), N  97 0.01
(0.1)
Notes. All responses relate to journeys taken between 9 a.m. and
5 p.m. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
aThis percentage is calculated from the number of journeys that
start at a rank and the number of journeys taken in day, and it was not
a question on the questionnaire.
bThemajority of drivers specifying this response outlined that they
would return to different rank in the center of the city.
Grosskopf and Pearce: Measuring Other-Regarding Preferences in the Taxi Market
Management Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–16, © 2020 The Author(s) 13
when the passenger is black. This result is robust to
controlling for variation in the testers’ appearance,
variation that otherwise could be driving the result.
It is also robust to correcting for potential multiple
comparison problems.
Although our results resonate with the group-
contingent social preference hypothesis, as with other
studies on discrimination, we acknowledge that we
cannot rule out statistical motivations. However, our
study distinguishes itself from previous work that ex-
amines discriminatory behavior in an important way.
Whereas previous observations of differential treat-
ment canbe entirely explainedby statisticalmotivations
that are consistent with profit maximization absent
social preferences, the behavior observed in our field
experiment necessitates social preferences even if
some sort of statistical discrimination exists. This is
because helping those one deems deserving of help
requires social preferences as well as some form of
discrimination.
We acknowledge that markets where transactions
are automated or done through a computer, such as
asset and financial markets are unlikely to see the
types of behaviors observed here. This is because the
nature of the interaction between buyer and seller
does not allow for such preferences to be expressed
because market agents are not given the opportunity
to behave in such a manner. However, many other
types of markets exist. Especially in markets where
bilateral face-to-face interactions are commonplace,
we expect other-regarding preferences to play amuch
greater role than previously suggested. Other-regarding
preferences may persist despite regulation and could
possibly only be overcome by centralization.
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Endnotes
1 See Guala and Filippin (2017) and Zizzo (2010, 2012) for some
critiques of the study of discrimination in the laboratory.
2Under the taxonomy of Harrison and List (2004), our experiment is
classified as a natural field experiment.
3The taxi markets we study satisfy all the requirements of a mar-
ketplace, as discussed by Al-Ubaydli and List (2019).
4This is the case in the cities that we study, but it varies throughout
Great Britain.
5Local authorities use the licensing of Hackney carriage drivers in
order to restrict the entry of new drivers. This is done in an effort to
stop supply exceeding demand.
6Tipping is not expected in Great Britain, as it is in other countries. In
a taxi, it is often common to round up to the nearest pound to facilitate
the payment.
7Many drivers are, however, affiliated with a firm from which they
can take private hire bookings.
8This figure is taken from the 2015 Unmet Taxi Demand Survey
published by the Manchester City Council.
9 In line with the ethics guidelines at the University of Exeter, we
invited everyone who applied for the job to an interview and made
job offers to everyone who attended the interview. This procedure
differs from that of Ayres and Siegelman (1995), where the experi-
menters selected the testers based on their own perception of “av-
erage attractiveness.”
10For example, Balafoutas et al. (2013) employed five testers.
11We discussed the short-distance/baseline treatment, which is de-
scribed in Section 3.2.
12Once the study was completed, all the testers were asked to guess
what they thought the study was about. None correctly identified the
research questions.
13As such, we follow the recruitment procedure used by Landry et al.
(2006) closely.
14The photo rating sessions were conducted at the end of other,
unrelated experimental sessions conducted at the University of
Exeter.
15Table B5 in Online Appendix B presents the correlations between
the testers’ perceived facial appearance characteristics.
16 In UK taxis, all passengers are required to sit in the back.
17For example, a tester would be required to take a journey from rank
A to location X and then walk (up to 15 minutes) to another rank in
order to take the next journey. We omit the routes to ensure the
anonymity of the drivers. For a sample of destinations, see Online
Appendix A.
18 Some of the destinations in the long-distance treatment did have
taxi ranks close by. However, for these journeys, because the drivers
were traveling between “local authorities,” they were prohibited
from picking up passengers at the destination.
19The first ride taken by each tester was discreetly observed by the
experimenter to ensure that he or she entered the taxi correctly.
20We did not use recording devices to monitor testers because of the
simple, highly stylizsed nature of the interaction. This is in line with
procedures used in other prominent studies that did not use re-
cording devices, such as Ayres and Siegelman (1995), Landry et al.
(2006), and Balafoutas et al. (2013). Castillo et al. (2013) study a
complex bargaining interaction and, as far aswe are aware, is the only
study that uses recording devices to monitor confederates. Although
important for their study, we felt the ethical considerations out-
weighed any potential benefits in our case. A consequence of this is
that the testers were not fully monitored and only had to hand in the
receipts for the journeys they took.
21This cannot be inferred from the receipts, which only contain in-
formation about the amount paid by the tester.
22Although the Manchester Council does not collect driver ethnic
demographics, the Birmingham City Council provided the following
information regarding the distribution of driver ethnicities (obtained
from a Freedom of Information request, number FOI 15327): 82.6%
South Asian, 9.6% white, 3.8% black, and 3.9% other. “Other” in-
cludes all drivers who declared other ethnicities (e.g., mixed) and
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those who did not disclose their ethnicity. The ethnic distribution of
our sample is representative of the population distribution.
23 It is worth pointing out what the experimental procedure was not.
The procedure was not an attempt to obtain free journeys by de-
manding them from the driver, nor did the testers maneuver the
driver into making a decision he or she did not want to make. The
testers were instructed to respect the driver at all times, and at no
point did the testers question the drivers’ right to charge the metered
fare. As the tester requests the reduction of the fare, the driver clearly
possesses the right to grant or refuse the request and charge
the metered amount: the interaction cannot be interpreted as a
negotiation.
24One could argue that there exists a selection effect in the business
card treatment. Those who are asked for a business card, and decide
to give one, are potentially different from those that are asked and do
not give a business card. Because drivers are randomly assigned to
treatments, these types should also be present in the baseline treat-
ment. However, because both being asked for and giving a business
card seem to be required to trigger reputational concerns, we can rule
out reputational concerns as a confound in the Baseline treatment.
We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
25Giving a business card is not found to be significantly correlated
with any of the elicited appearance characteristics or the gender of the
testers, the demographics of the driver, or the ride characteristics.
26 In addition, we find some evidence that a driver who tries to start a
conversation with the passenger (even though the passenger did not
engage) does give significantly more of the journey for free. Other
control variables, such as traffic intensity and weather, are not found
to be correlated with giving.
27To test to see whether our results are mainly due to appearance
differences or driven by particular individuals, we compare each of
the 12 white testers with each of the 7 black testers and note whether
the white testers get more than the black testers (in terms of both
pounds and the amount given as a percentage of the expected fare).
We find that when comparing giving in pounds, in 69 of 84 com-
parisons, the white tester is given more. When comparing giving as a
percentage of the expected fare, the white tester is given more in 71 of
the 84 comparisons. These comparisons are given in Tables B10 and
B11 of Online Appendix B.
28 For instance, drivers might want to help those in need regardless of
race but might have different beliefs about the need of the passenger.
They might think that some groups are more honest than others or
simply have coarser beliefs for those populations with which they
interact less frequently.
29 See Table A1 of Online Appendix A for the exact amounts.
30This is because drivers are told about the amount the tester can
afford when the meter reaches £3 in the short-distance treatment and
£6 in the long-distance treatment.
31The survey and observations were conducted in Manchester. The
questionnaire is given in Online Appendix A.
32Drivers were also asked to report their income, but the majority
refused to disclose this information.
33Passengers are allowed to bargain with drivers ex ante or before
they enter the taxi. However, if no discount is agreed prior to the
journey beginning, the driver is allowed to charge the metered fare
by law.
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